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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE CITY OF SALT LAKE,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

JONATHAN LAMAR ARCHIBALD,

:

Case No. 20001079-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

SUMMARY
On appeal Mr. Archibald is challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to
suppress. Mr. Archibald maintains that the trial court erred in determining that he was
not seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
In response to Mr. Archibald's arguments on appeal, the City claims that Mr.
Archibald was not seized because he chose to open the door to his motel room and the
officers used no force to compel him to do so. Essentially, the City claims that because
Mr. Archibald could have ignored the constant knocking by the officers, he was not
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

ARGUMENT
I

THE CITY'S ARGUMENT THAT MR. ARCHIBALD WAS NOT SEIZED
IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IGNORES THE
UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE ENCOUNTER
BETWEEN MR. ARCHIBALD AND THE POLICE OFFICERS

A.

Mr. Archibald Was Seized for Fourth Amendment Purposes
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized three levels of police encounters with the

public which are constitutionally permissible:
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions so
long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize
a person if the officer has an "articulable suspicion11 that the person has
committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the "detention must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of
the stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable
cause to believe an offense has been committed or is being committed.
State v. Deitman. 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (quoting United States v. Merritt,
736 F.2d 223,230 (5th Cir.1984) (citation omitted)).
The hallmark of a level I voluntary police-citizen encounter is the right of a citizen
to decline answering an officer's inquiries simply by walking away. Salt Lake City v.
Rav. 998 P.2d 274, 277 (Utah App. 2000); State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah App.
1994); State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah App. 1990). Most level I encounters
occur when a citizen in a public place is approached by police officers. See, e.g., Ray,
998 P.2d at 274 (in front of a convenience store); Deitman. 739 P.2d at 616 (on public
sidewalk/street); State v. Davis, 821 P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1991) (on the side of a public
road). A level I encounter may escalate into a level II encounter when, viewing the
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totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that he or she is not free
to leave. State v. Struhs. 940 P.2d 1225 , 1227-28 (Utah App. 1997); Jackson. 805 P.2d
at 767. A reasonable person would not feel free to leave when an officer, by show of
physical force or authority, restrains that person's liberty. Ray. 998 P.2d at 277; Bean.
869 P.2d at 986. The subjective intent of an officer is irrelevant to the determination of
whether a Fourth Amendment seizure or violation has occurred. See Maryland v. Macon.
472 U.S. 463,470-71, 105 S. Ct. 2778,2782-83, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985) ("Whether a
Fourth Amendment violation has occurred 'turns on an objective assessment of the
officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time' and
not on the officer's actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken."
(citation omitted) (quoting Scott v. United States. 436 U.S. 128, 136, 98 S. Ct. 1717,
1723, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978)).
The City argues that because Mr. Archibald could have declined to look out the
window when he heard the knocks on the door to his motel room and because he could
have refused to answer the officers' persistent knocking at his door, Mr. Archibald was
not seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Essentially, the City argues that Mr.
Archibald "chose" to have an encounter with the police officers when he responded to the
officers' knocking and thus, there was not a sufficient show of authority by the officers to
convert the voluntary encounter into a seizure requiring reasonable suspicion. The City's
arguments will be addressed below in relation to three relevant factors: the time of the
3

encounter, the location of the encounter and the length of time the officers knocked on
Mr. Archibald's door.
i.

Time of the Encounter

First, the City asserts that because Mr. Archibald did not cite to code sections §§
77-7-5(2) (1999) and 77-23-205(1) (1999) now referenced on appeal, this Court should
disregard them. However, the City fails to acknowledge the difference between
arguments not raised below and authority not asserted below. Mr. Archibald argued in
the trial court that the time the officers knocked on his door contributed to the
unreasonableness of his encounter with the officers. (R. 16-25.) Mr. Archibald's citation
to statutory authority on appeal to support his argument is wholly permissible as it serves
only to bolster previously raised arguments. Thus, the City's request of this Court to
disregard supporting authority is not well taken.
The City attempts to characterize Mr. Archibald's argument as one seeking to limit
police work in the community to specified hours. This is an incorrect summary of Mr.
Archibald's assertions. The essence of Mr. Archibald's argument with respect to the time
of the encounter has always been, and continues to be, that the unreasonable time of the
encounter is but one factor contributing to the conclusion that Mr. Archibald was seized
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. There is a distinct difference in reasonableness
between a citizen or police officer knocking on one's door at nighttime rather than
daytime, a difference between a knock on one's door at midnight rather than noon. If
4

there were no distinction, then officers would not need special judicial authorization and
justification in order to execute a search warrant at night. See Utah Code Ann. 77-23205(1) (1999). Implicit in the requirement of additional justification for the nighttime
execution of a search warrant is the assumption that the daytime execution of a search
warrant is more reasonable than the nighttime execution of such a warrant, based solely
on the time of execution.
By analogy, it is more reasonable to expect an unsolicited knock at one's front
door during the daytime hours than during the nighttime hours. The officers first knocked
on Mr. Archibald's motel room door at 10:47 p.m., a nighttime hour pursuant to sections
77-23-205(1) and 77-7-5(2) of the Utah Code. The officers' incessant knocking at Mr.
Archibald's door was not preceded by any attempt to investigate the anonymous tip
which led the officers to Mr. Archibald's room to begin with, namely that there were drug
and solicitation activities going on in Mr. Archibald's motel room. The officers did not
bother to conduct surveillance but simply proceeded directly to Mr. Archibald's room at
nearly 11 p.m. and began pounding on the motel room door. Any reasonable person
would consider a knock on one's door for any reason at such a late hour inappropriate,
absent an emergency.
Mr. Archibald does not seek to establish a bright-line rule prohibiting police
contact with citizens at their homes at particular times; rather, Mr. Archibald simply
argues that the unreasonableness of the time of the encounter contributes to the
5

conclusion that Mr. Archibald was seized. A legally recognized difference has been
established between daytime and nighttime. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-23-205(1)
and 77-7-5(2) (1999). Implicit in that clear legal distinction is a recognized difference
between the reasonableness of encounters during the daytime versus the nighttime,
particularly at one's front door. Thus, the time of the officers' knocking contributes to
the conclusion that Mr. Archibald was seized.
ii

Location of the Encounter

The City claims that because Mr. Archibald was at his residence, he should have
felt more empowered to decline the officers' knocks at his door. "If a citizen is going to
feel he has any alternative options, it is at his residence - as opposed to being stopped on
a public street. If citizens' homes are their castles, then citizens are going to feel more
empowered at home than if engaged on a sidewalk or street." (Appellee's Brief at 14.)
The City's claim is contrary to the basis tenets of the Fourth Amendment.
A warrantless search of a residence is constitutionally permissible
where probable cause and exigent circumstances are proven. "Warrantless
entries are justified with probable cause and exigent circumstances because
in such circumstances, the delay to obtain a search warrant would risk
'physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant
evidence, [or] the escape of the suspect.'" However, when a private
residence is involved, the State's burden in proving probable cause and
exigent circumstances is " 'particularly heavy.'" This elevated burden is a
result of the "heightened expectation of privacy" that citizens enjoy in
their own homes.
State v. Yoder. 935 P.2d 534, 540 (Utah App. 1997) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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In terms of Fourth Amendment protections, the home is sacrosanct and entitled to
the highest level of protection from unwarranted intrusions. To argue that because an
officer approaches an individual at his or her residence, that individual should somehow
feel "empowered" to decline to speak with persistently knocking officers defies reason. It
is precisely because the home enjoys such an elevated status under the Fourth
Amendment that police encounters with citizens at their homes are objectively more
intrusive and coercive.
The City argues there is a difference between a person approached by officers in a
dead-end alley and the officers' approach of Mr. Archibald at his motel room. To the
contrary, Mr. Archibald's confinement in his motel room is nearly identical to the
situation faced by a person cornered by police officers in a dead-end alley. The City
asserts that Mr. Archibald had the option of retreating into his room rather than answering
the knocks at his door, whereas a person cornered in a dead-end alley has no option but to
remain in the presence of the officers or move past the officers to continue on his or her
way.
The City's analysis is flawed. Mr. Archibald had the same choices available to
him as would a person cornered by police officers in a dead-end alley. When Mr.
Archibald initially heard knocking at his door, he went to window and looked outside.
When Mr. Archibald observed two uniformed, armed police officers, he retreated into his
room without answering the door. Not content with Mr. Archibald's apparent
7

unwillingness to respond to their knocks, the officers continued knocking on Mr.
Archibald's door for 45 seconds straight after seeing that Mr. Archibald was inside the
room. Mr. Archibald was faced with a Hobson's choice: remain in the presence of the
officers knocking at his door by staying in his motel room or remain in the presence of
the officers by attempting to leave his room, thereby placing himself in the direct path of
the officers. The City seems to suggest that Mr. Archibald should be required to leave
the safety, privacy and comfort of his residence to avoid the officers' incessant knocking.
If indeed a person's home is his or her castle, police officers should not be entitled to
constructively evict a person, even temporarily, from his or her home.
The City argues this case involves ffmere interaction" between Mr. Archibald and
the police officers, dealing neither with restraint by physical force nor constructive
restraint by show of authority. (Appellee's Brief at 12-13.) To support its position, the
City argues that Mr. Archibald's "first option was to decide whether or not to even look
out the window. In one's abode at 10:47 PM one need not even look out the window
upon hearing a knock at the door." (Appellee's Brief at 13.)
The City's argument is inventive at best, given that any reasonable person who
heard an unexpected knock on their door at nearly 11:00 p.m. would investigate to see
who the late-night visitor was. The City further argues that Mr. Archibald simply could
have ignored the police officers' knocking on his door, retreated into his residence or
simply left the residence by walking out the same door where the officers stood knocking.
8

Most compelling is the fact that initially, Mr. Archibald did exactly what the City
suggests: he ignored the police officers' knocking on his door and retreated into his motel
room. That attempt was consciously disregarded by the officers and was met by more
persistent knocking. Mr. Archibald heard the knocking on his door and looked out a
curtained window to ascertain the identity of the visitors. Mr. Archibald observed two
armed, uniformed police officers and retreated from the window back into his room. Mr.
Archibald did not answer the door, yell or give any other indication to the officers that he
intended to exit the room or otherwise comply with their request to come to the door.
Upon seeing a face in the curtained window of the room, the officers continued
knocking for 45 seconds straight, until Mr. Archibald relented and answered the door.
The City seems to argue that Mr. Archibald is somehow responsible for the officers'
persistent knocking. The City states: "It is entirely reasonable to assume that had the
defendant not disclosed his presence - and the fact that he was awake - the officers
would have gone on their way." (Appellee's brief at 18.) There is nothing in the record
to support this assertion.
The City urges this Court to consider Mr. Archibald's "voluntary" conduct.
Particularly, the City argues that Mr. Archibald "chose to engage the officers by opening
the door." (Appellee's Brief at 19.) The City supports its argument with State v.
Jackson. 805 P.2d 765 (Utah App. 1990) and Lavton Citv v. Bennett. 741 P.2d 965 (Utah
9

App. 1987), ostensibly bolstering the proposition that voluntary conduct by a defendant in
initiating contact with police officers negates a claim of an unlawful seizure. The City's
reliance on these cases ignores fundamental factual differences between those cases and
the facts currently before this Court.
In Jackson, the defendant was followed by a police officer into the parking lot of a
bar. However, the officer did not activate his overheard lights or siren or otherwise
attempt to effectuate a level II stop. Instead, the officer simply pulled his vehicle into the
parking lot behind the defendant's car and as the officer's car was still moving, the
defendant approached the officer. 805 P.2d at 766-67. The Court noted that although the
police officers' car blocked the defendant's car, the act of blocking did not start until the
defendant had initiated contact with the police officer. IdL That is, the officer had
engaged in no conduct reflective of an attempt to make contact with the defendant. Id.
In Bennett, an officer followed the defendant as the defendant parked his truck at a
construction site. 741 P.2d at 967. Although the officer had not activated his lights or
sirens, or otherwise conveyed to the defendant a desire to speak with him, the defendant
approached the officer and initiated a conversation with the officer. Id. This Court
concluded that such an encounter was consensual and voluntary.
Bennett and Jackson are distinguishable from the instant matter. In both Bennett
and Jackson, the defendants initiated conversations with police officers by approaching
the officers without any prompting by the officer. In the instant matter, however, the only
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reason Mr. Archibald interacted with the officers ab initio was because the officers
persistently banged at his door, prompting him to answer due to the length of the
knocking. It is clear the officers initiated contact with Mr. Archibald, supporting Mr.
Archibald's assertion that the encounter between himself and the officers was a seizure
requiring reasonable suspicion or probable cause, entirely absent in this case.
iii

Length of Knocking

The City argues that once the officers observed the occupant of the motel room
was awake and present in the room but declining to answer, it was reasonable to "expect
that the person at the door [would] knock again." (Appellee's Brief at 21.) To the
contrary, once Mr. Archibald saw that there were two armed, uniformed police officers
knocking on his door at a late hour and he refused to answer their initial knocks, it was
unreasonable for the officers to continue knocking for 45 additional seconds when it was
abundantly clear Mr. Archibald had heard the knocks and did not wish to speak with the
officers.
By declining to respond to the officers' first knocks, upon seeing the officers
standing outside his door, Mr. Archibald implicitly rejected the officers' invitation to
come to the front door. Thereafter, the officers' decision to knock for an additional
period of time after seeing Mr. Archibald move away from the curtained window of his
motel room, left Mr. Archibald with no other option but to respond to knocking. There is
no indication in the record that the officers intended to cease their attempts to contact Mr.
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Archibald, regardless of his actions. The fact that the officers continued to knock after
seeing Mr. Archibald look out the window, despite the failure of Mr. Archibald to
voluntarily go to the fact door at that point, demonstrates that the officers were not going
to take no for an answer. Under these circumstances, the length of knocking strongly
corroborates Mr. Archibald's assertion that he was seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
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CONCLUSION
Under the totality of the circumstances presented here, Mr. Archibald was seized
without reasonable suspicion or probable cause in violation the Fourth Amendment.
Accordingly, we respectfully request that this Court reverse the district court's decision
denying Mr. Archibald's motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings, if any.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this %<±_ day of May, 2001.

ROMERO
ley for Defendant
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